By Daniel Nduka Okonkwo

How can a government claiming to be building a sustainable economy when ordinary Nigerians are expected to survive on a minimum wage of ₦70,000 a month, while the officials who shape the nation’s economic policies enjoy remuneration packages exceeding ₦2 million monthly, including allowances? The injustice becomes even more glaring when ₦70,000 is recognised as merely the official minimum-wage benchmark, far removed from the reality of millions of workers who earn ₦30,000 a month or even less.

This is the fundamental contradiction at the heart of Nigeria’s economic crisis: those who design the policies are shielded from the suffering of those forced to live with their consequences. What, then, does economic reform mean to a worker whose income cannot adequately feed a family, educate children, and provide shelter? No government can credibly claim to be building a sustainable economy while millions of its citizens struggle merely to survive and those entrusted with shaping their economic future remain protected by financial privileges far beyond the reach of ordinary people.

Nigeria’s economic reforms, domestic crude oil pricing, petrol affordability, and the widening divide between political privilege and public hardship

Nigeria’s economic crisis raises a fundamental question about governance: can policies designed by financially insulated political leaders adequately protect citizens struggling to afford food, transportation, electricity, and housing? The question becomes more urgent when government officials defend painful economic reforms in the language of fiscal discipline while millions of households confront rising living costs.

The metaphor of trees voting for the axe captures a disturbing political contradiction people may continue supporting systems whose decisions undermine their welfare. In Nigeria, the deeper question is whether those making economic decisions adequately understand the hardship their policies impose on ordinary citizens.

For millions of Nigerians, economic policy is not an abstract debate about exchange rates, foreign reserves, fiscal balances, or market efficiency. It is the daily calculation of whether a salary will last until the end of the month, whether children can remain in school, whether a family can afford nutritious food, and whether workers can travel to their workplaces without surrendering a substantial portion of their earnings.

Political officeholders, however, may benefit from official remuneration, allowances, and publicly funded facilities that cushion some of these pressures. This disparity creates an elite, mass disconnect in which the experiences and incentives of decision-makers become detached from the economic realities of the people they govern.

The argument is not that every economic reform is inherently wrong or that Nigeria can indefinitely ignore the fiscal costs of subsidies. Poorly administered subsidy systems can encourage waste, diversion, and rent-seeking, while unsustainable public expenditure can undermine economic stability. The fundamental question is whether reforms are designed and implemented fairly, whether their burdens are distributed equitably, and whether their promised benefits can be demonstrated. A government cannot establish the success of its economic programme merely by pointing to improvements in selected macroeconomic indicators while households continue to experience declining purchasing power, inadequate public services, and rising living costs.

The implementation of Nigeria’s ₦70,000 national minimum wage under the 2024 minimum-wage legislation represented an important development in labour policy. Yet a higher nominal wage does not automatically translate into greater economic security. When food prices, transportation fares, electricity expenses, and other essential costs rise faster than earnings, workers may receive more money while becoming less able to afford necessities.

The real test of a minimum wage is therefore not simply its numerical value but the quantity of essential goods and services it can purchase.

The consequences extend beyond individual households. Rising energy costs increase expenses for transport operators, farmers, manufacturers, and small businesses, many of which pass those costs on to consumers. Workers face higher prices without automatic adjustments to their salaries, leaving less money for healthcare, education, and savings. A wage increase that fails to keep pace with living costs can offer limited relief. Government policy must address the conditions eroding purchasing power rather than treating the announcement of a new minimum wage as sufficient evidence of improved welfare.

The disparity between workers’ earnings and political officeholders’ remuneration raises legitimate questions about the cost of governance. In an August 2024 clarification, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) stated that a senator’s prescribed monthly salary and allowances totalled ₦1,063,860. Its published breakdown included ₦126,650 for motor vehicle fuelling and maintenance, ₦126,650 for domestic staff, ₦50,660 for entertainment, ₦50,660 for utilities, and ₦42,216.66 for wardrobe expenses.

The package also included a constituency allowance of approximately ₦422,167. These figures represent the commission’s prescribed remuneration schedule, not necessarily every payment or benefit an individual senator receives.

The contrast is significant: under that published schedule, a senator’s prescribed vehicle-fuelling and maintenance allowance alone exceeds the entire monthly national minimum wage of ₦70,000. Allowances for domestic staff, utilities, and other expenses widen the disparity. Public officeholders require appropriate resources to discharge legitimate responsibilities, but the scale and structure of their remuneration deserve scrutiny in a country where many citizens struggle to meet basic needs.

 Claims about additional office-running payments, bulletproof vehicles, medical benefits, and other privileges must be verified against budget documents, payment records, and official disclosures before being presented as facts. The public deserves accountability grounded in evidence, not speculation.

Nigeria’s petroleum industry presents another contradiction: a major crude oil producer whose citizens have endured expensive petrol, foreign-exchange pressures, and costly energy. The emergence of domestic refining capacity, particularly the Dangote Refinery, has raised expectations that local production could reduce dependence on imported petroleum products and strengthen energy security. Yet domestic refining does not automatically guarantee cheaper fuel. Refiners must account for crude oil, processing, financing, transportation, distribution, and other operating expenses, while international oil prices, exchange rates, and refining margins influence the final cost of petroleum products.

The debate becomes particularly important when domestically produced crude oil is sold to local refiners at prices linked to international market benchmarks. Although crude oil has an internationally

recognized economic value, the fact that Nigeria’s crude is priced against global benchmarks should not end the debate about how the country’s natural wealth can best serve its people. Crude oil is a natural resource belonging to the nation, and its management should ultimately contribute to the welfare, economic security, and prosperity of Nigerians.

Selling crude oil below its market value can reduce public revenue, create implicit fiscal costs, and encourage arbitrage or preferential access. However, policymakers must also account for the wider economic consequences of expensive energy, including rising transportation costs, declining industrial competitiveness, higher food prices, and the crushing pressure on households that depend on petrol-powered generators because the electricity supply remains unreliable. These costs are not abstract economic figures; they affect how much ordinary Nigerians spend on food, how businesses remain operational, and whether families can afford necessities.

The national interest must therefore be measured not only by how much revenue the government earns from crude oil but also by how the management and pricing of that resource affect people’s lives. If petroleum pricing policies generate substantial revenue while imposing unsustainable costs on households and businesses, those consequences deserve serious scrutiny.

The objective should not be to sell crude oil cheaply at any cost, but to develop a transparent, sustainable, and accountable petroleum pricing framework that balances public revenue with energy affordability, industrial growth, and citizens’ welfare. Nigeria’s natural wealth should not merely strengthen government accounts; it should also improve the living conditions of the people in whose name that wealth is held.

Nigeria should therefore evaluate transparent crude-supply arrangements, predictable pricing mechanisms, refinery efficiency, competition among suppliers, and the broader benefits of domestic production. Any intervention must be assessed for its fiscal implications, operational feasibility, and vulnerability to diversion or rent-seeking. Policymakers should explain what economic advantages domestic refining is expected to deliver, how those advantages will be measured, and what obstacles prevent them from reaching consumers.

The objective should be an efficient petroleum market that strengthens energy security and domestic production while protecting the public interest, rather than an assumption that local refining alone will resolve fuel affordability.

The federal government and supporters of petrol subsidy removal have a substantive economic argument. Maintaining prices below their economic cost can require significant public expenditure, weaken government finances, and divert resources from infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other priorities. Poorly administered subsidy arrangements can also create opportunities for smuggling, diversion, and fraudulent claims. Allowing petroleum prices to reflect market conditions can reduce direct subsidy obligations and potentially improve incentives for investment in domestic refining. These considerations deserve serious examination in a country facing substantial financing needs and competing demands on public revenue.

The International Monetary Fund has acknowledged improvements in aspects of Nigeria’s macroeconomic position following the government’s reform measures while also highlighting persistent

poverty and food insecurity. Its 2025 Article IV assessment underscores the importance of fiscal sustainability, effective public spending, and support for vulnerable households. The central issue is not whether subsidy removal can produce fiscal benefits in principle, but whether those benefits are realised, transparently accounted for, and translated into improvements in public welfare. Projected savings must not be confused with money actually received, recorded, and allocated to development priorities.

The government must demonstrate what happened to the resources expected to be released by subsidy removal. Oil production, international prices, exchange rates, and debt-servicing obligations complicate public finance, but these constraints make transparent accounting more important, not less. Regular public disclosures should distinguish estimated savings from realised fiscal gains, identify transfers to relevant levels of government, and explain how the resulting resources were spent.

Independent audits, accessible budget reports, and measurable performance indicators would enable citizens to assess whether promised investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and social protection are materialising. Without such evidence, asking citizens to accept persistently higher living costs in exchange for benefits they cannot identify or verify risks deepening public distrust.

The central distributional question surrounding Nigeria’s economic reforms is not simply whether they impose costs, but who bears those costs and what protections exist for people least able to absorb them. Higher petrol prices will increase transport fares, raise the cost of moving agricultural produce and manufactured goods, and push up the operating expenses of small businesses.

Employers may respond by increasing prices, reducing production, or limiting employment. Households then face competing demands on shrinking real incomes, often having to choose between food, healthcare, education, and other necessities. These pressures are especially severe where public transportation is inadequate, electricity supply is unreliable, and social protection programmes fail to reach vulnerable citizens effectively.

When policymakers are financially insulated from the consequences of their decisions, they may experience these pressures differently from citizens who depend on public transport, struggle to pay electricity bills, or devote most of their earnings to food. This does not mean every wealthy official lacks empathy or that financial comfort inevitably produces bad policy.

It is an institutional concern about incentives, accountability, and the relationship between decision-makers and the people affected by their choices. Appeals for patience become less persuasive when citizens see limited evidence of restraint in government expenditure or tangible improvements in public services. Shared sacrifice must be demonstrated through decisions, budgets, and measurable outcomes, not merely invoked in official speeches.

Fiscal discipline must therefore extend beyond the removal of consumer subsidies. It should include transparent reviews of recurrent expenditure, stronger procurement controls, the elimination of waste, reduced administrative duplication, and rigorous assessments of whether public institutions deliver value for money. Official allowances, travel budgets, vehicle purchases, office renovations, and administrative expenses should be assessed against clearly defined responsibilities and the country’s fiscal circumstances.

Where expenditure is unnecessary or disproportionate, savings should be redirected towards essential services and productive investment. The objective is not to punish public officials for holding office, but to ensure that the privileges associated with public service remain proportionate to their responsibilities and that the government applies financial discipline to its own spending as rigorously as it applies it to household support.

International institutions, including the IMF and World Bank, emphasise fiscal sustainability, improved revenue collection, economic stability, infrastructure investment, and conditions that support private-sector growth.

These are legitimate policy objectives, but macroeconomic stability and social welfare are not interchangeable measures of success. A stronger exchange rate does not automatically mean that low-income families can afford nutritious food.

Higher government revenue does not guarantee adequately supplied hospitals, while increased investment does not ensure that employment reaches communities experiencing the greatest hardship. The World Bank has also stressed the importance of translating Nigeria’s economic progress into tangible gains for poor and vulnerable citizens through more efficient public expenditure, measures to address food inflation, and stronger social protection.

A fairer economic settlement would require independently verifiable accounts of subsidy-related savings, transparent reviews of the cost of governance, and clear reporting on the outcomes of public expenditure. Nigeria should assess domestic crude supply and refining arrangements through transparent economic analysis, weighing their fiscal implications against their effects on energy affordability, industrial competitiveness, and household welfare.

Minimum-wage policy should be accompanied by effective enforcement, measures to improve productivity, and attention to the erosion of real earnings. Targeted cash transfers, affordable public transportation, accessible healthcare, and reliable electricity can help protect vulnerable households as broader reforms take effect. These interventions must themselves be transparent, properly targeted, and independently evaluated to minimise waste and ensure that assistance reaches those for whom it is intended.

The test of leadership is not whether officials can persuade Nigerians to endure difficult reforms, but whether they can demonstrate that those reforms are necessary, fairly implemented, and capable of producing measurable public benefits.

If the country must ask citizens to sacrifice in the interest of economic stability, the political class must demonstrate restraint, transparency, and accountability. If Nigeria’s petroleum resources are to be valued at international market rates, the government must also ensure that the wider economic benefits are not undermined by wasteful expenditure, weak public services, and inadequate protection for vulnerable households. As long as political leaders remain insulated from the economic insecurity experienced by those they govern, public confidence will remain fragile. The solution is not to abandon fiscal discipline, but to apply it consistently, beginning with the institutions that control public resources. Economic reform must not become a system in which ordinary Nigerians are permanently required to sacrifice while those in power remain protected from the consequences. If national recovery requires shared sacrifice, that sacrifice must begin at the top and ultimately produce tangible improvements in the lives of the people.

Daniel Nduka Okonkwo is an investigative journalist, human rights advocate, and policy analyst based in Nigeria. He is the founder and publisher of Profiles International Human Rights Advocate (PIHRA), a platform documenting the courage of human rights defenders and examining issues of governance, accountability, security, and fundamental rights.

His reporting on Nigerian governance, security-sector accountability, public finance, and human rights has appeared in Sahara Reporters, Vanguard, Daily Trust, African Defence Forum, Opinion Nigeria, and Daily Intel. Read more of his work on the PIHRA website:https://www.profilesinternationalhumanrightsadvocate.com.ng/ For tips, feedback, or collaboration, contact him at dan.okonkwo.73@gmail.com.

At least 72 civilians who had been prospecting for gold in a border region of Sudan have been killed in air strikes, a regional rights group said.

Emergency Lawyers, based in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, said jets targeted the so-called artisanal miners at a popular gold mining site on Saturday.

Neither the Egyptian government nor the de facto Sudanese authorities have so far commented.

Cairo has previously faced accusations of deadly strikes on gold prospectors as part of a crackdown on illicit activity along its southern border.

Emergency Lawyers noted the previous alleged attacks and said they represented not only a violation of Sudan’s sovereign territory but demonstrated the government’s lack of control over the region.

“The deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians violates international humanitarian law and the right to life,” it said in a statement on Sunday. “These acts may constitute war crimes.”

It noted that its death toll was provisional and could rise.

The Paris-based Sudan Tribune reported that the death toll could far exceed the number reported by Emergency Lawyers, citing a survivor of Saturday’s attack who said many more people had been injured.

Eyewitnesses said the attack began around 06:00 local time (04:00 GMT), with the aircraft firing more than five missiles directly at the miners’ camps, destroying them and excavation pits with people still inside, the newspaper wrote.

The Sudan Tribune reported claims in June that Egyptian forces had used drones and artillery to target artisanal mining sites in the same region, killing several, after sporadic incidents of Egyptian border guards of burning equipment, torching temporary shelters, and firing live ammunition to disperse mine workers.

Days later, Egypt’s border agency announced that it and the military had begun a sweeping security campaign along the border to foil illegal migration, drug smuggling and illegal mining.

At the same time, Sudan’s de facto leader announced an investigation into the alleged strikes, which were said to have killed dozens.

Gold lies at the core of the border tensions.

Sudan’s ongoing civil war has led to a surge in artisanal mining – and often risky practice conducted by civilians with rudimentary tools and without official permission – particularly in remote areas near its borders.

Gold-rich areas lie along porous borders in terrain historically associated with cross-border smuggling routes, with artisanally mined gold potentially feeding into those channels.

Egypt’s border force said in June that it had seized 86 tonnes of gold ore along with amateur prospecting equipment.

Artisanal mining has also reportedly continued in Sudan’s conflict zones and smuggled gold may be a source of income for armed insurgent groups.

This has raised concerns of illicit Sudanese gold undermining the legitimate Egyptian gold market.

Several German fighter jets will take part in the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) annual nuclear defence exercise this week as troops from 17 countries take part in the Steadfast Noon drill.

The German Air Force said three Tornado jets will take part in the exercise hosted by Italy, which starts Tuesday and runs for about a week and a half.

The jets are normally stationed in Büchel in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate.

NATO has not revealed the exercise scenario but said its scale would be comparable to last year’s drill, which involved around 2,000 personnel and more than 70 aircraft.

Last week, NATO’s head of nuclear policy, Nassima Barrows, said the exercise was designed to demonstrate the alliance’s readiness and ability to defend its territory.

No real nuclear weapons will be used, she added.

NATO said the exercise was not linked to current events or directed at any specific country.

Military experts say the drills, held regularly in October, include practising the safe transport of weapons from underground storage facilities to aircraft and mounting them on fighter jets.

Only practice bombs without real nuclear warheads are used during the drills.