OPINION
Engaging Police Community Relations in Tackling Nation Insecurity
A successful security of lives and property in a nation is feasible when there is an effective line of communication within the neighbourhood for effective information gathering. Records showed that a successful security operation towards nipping a crime in its early stages is intelligent information gathering from a particular locality and not a display of mere sectoral weaponry, which has resulted in a security waterloo in the time past.
Most of the developed world security outfits, either military or police, base their tactical operations on intelligent information gathering mainly from local residents or special agents earmarked for such assignments. Findings have shown that most of these security operatives from the developed countries have achieved a lot in the provision of adequate security for their citizens through surveillance and preventive tactical approaches rather than battling methods.Today most African nations are still battling with rising rates of crimes and criminality across their neighbourhoods without effectively applying a community relations approach, where some selected residents will be a secured instrument of information for security operatives. First-hand information received from the locale and community will help in no small measure to nip the crime in the bud before it bursts with collateral damage, which has been our recurrent story.Globally, security is always under a specialised body, an organisation or department responsible for providing security by enforcing laws, rules, and regulations as well as maintaining order. But the entire gamut of a nation’s security system can be rendered ineffective in curbing crimes and criminality when it is overstressed, lacks adequate manpower and modern equipment, is poorly funded, and lacks reliable information gathering techniques.The Nigerian government across various levels has put in place staffer security measures, and they should be commended for implementing several of them towards fighting crimes. Some of these measures include the purchase of helicopters, surveillance drones, patrol vans, bulletproof vests, walkie-talkie communication gadgets, the installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV), and the establishment of local security outfits like Amotekun in the Southwest, among others across nations. Despite this, the country’s security architecture is still facing significant security challenges in effectively carrying out its constitutional role, particularly in preventing and nipping crimes in the bud and bringing offenders to quick justice to serve as a deterrent to others.This has exacerbated crime rates such as smuggling, banditry, high-class terrorism, kidnapping, drug peddling, cultism, and ritualism among others on a daily basis among the youths, as all designated security agencies, including the Nigerian Police Force, Nigeria Immigration Service, Department of State Services, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigerian Army, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, and Nigerian Navy, are overwhelmed with the growing criminal’s effronteries.Recent findings show that, for Nigeria to achieve success in all its security implementations there is a need for synergy, collaboration, as well as a feedback mechanism among all the security agencies and the engagement of citizens, particularly the leadership of communities across the nation.The step in achieving the security community relations for effective information gathering in successful security operations led to the establishment of the Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC) in 1984 by the then Inspector-General of Police, Etim Inyang. Initially, the PCRC functioned at the state, area command, and divisional levels to enhance efficient and effective policing in Nigerian communities.To further regulate activities of the association for uniformity across levels, a national body was formed in 2006, which led to the election of national PCRC officers.The operations of PCRC were legalised and reinvigorated through Section 113(1) of the Police Act 2020, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. Additionally, Section 117(2) of the same Act states that “The Inspector General of Police (IGP), in implementing community policing, shall promote organisational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address conditions that cause crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”These partnerships and improved understanding implemented between the public and the police have contributed greatly to crime prevention, control, and improved overall security through intelligence/information gathering and corresponding actions that have changed the security narratives today.The government at all levels should therefore empower PCRC for effective coordination in surveillance as local community intelligence to achieve its set goals.Firstly, the PCRC was established to partner with the Nigeria Police Force to create a cordial working relationship that benefits both the police and the general public in crime prevention. Secondly, it was established to assist the NPF in combating crimes by gathering intelligence on criminal activities within its communities. Thirdly, the PCRC also offers logistical assistance and facilitates problem-solving discussions with the NPF.PCRC are selected executive members from different Community Development Associations (CDA) among interested residents, who will be trained through seminars, conferences, and workshops on crime prevention strategies and intelligence gathering. Above all, the PCRC members should also be protected and secured so as to promote delivery, as they function as a bridge between the police and the public through various stakeholders with the goal of reducing crime and promoting adequate security in communities.Records showed that a lot of criminal-related disputes had been successfully resolved across communities in the states through the mutual relationship between the police and PCRC. It is therefore evident that, for the country to effectively police the nation and rid it of crimes, other security agencies should also key into the PCRC model towards making communities crime-free.In all, the PCRC strategy is indeed a bold step taken by the Nigeria Police Force to prevent and control crimes as well as ensure public safety through police and community partnerships. It is obvious from the appraisal that the PCRC has proved an effective tool in crime control and prevention and can equally boost the security architecture of the country. But there are setbacks that need to be addressed in order to improve the performance of the PCRC and public safety and security generally. It is true that security is everybody’s business, and if you see something, say something.
OPINION
Why Broadcasters Should Call For Solidarity
By Isaac Asabor
The recent incident involving a media professional and a representative of the Federal Capital Territory administration has raised important questions about the safety, dignity and independence of broadcasters in Nigeria.
At the heart of the matter is not simply an exchange between an individual broadcaster and a public official.
It is a broader question of how the media should respond when attempts are made to dictate the circumstances under which broadcasters perform their professional duties.Broadcasters have a responsibility to stand in solidarity with one another when the independence of the press comes under pressure, particularly when attempts to dictate who can question public officials threaten to become accepted practice.
The Independent Broadcasting Association of Nigeria (IBAN), a national body representing private television and radio broadcasters across Nigeria, exists to advance excellence, fairness and innovation in the media industry. Its role underscores the importance of protecting an independent broadcasting sector capable of serving the public without undue interference.
Independent broadcasters are central to Nigeria’s media pluralism. They provide diverse perspectives that reflect the country’s rich mix of cultures, languages and communities. They also create platforms through which grassroots voices can be heard and communities can engage with issues that directly affect their lives. That role makes editorial independence particularly important.
Unlike state-controlled media, independent broadcasters have a responsibility to maintain editorial freedom and local relevance. Their strength lies in their ability to provide space for different perspectives, including views that may sometimes challenge those in positions of authority.
It is against the foregoing background that the incident deserves broader consideration. One of the most troubling aspects of the matter is the apparent attempt to determine which journalist should be allowed to ask questions while an official was being represented. Public officials are accountable to the public, and journalists serve as one of the channels through which citizens demand that accountability.
A public official cannot reasonably expect to determine which journalist or broadcaster rather is qualified to ask questions simply because the questions may be uncomfortable.
Broadcasters may differ in style, experience and approach, but the right to ask legitimate questions should not depend on whether those questions are convenient to the person being interviewed.
Allowing public officials to select only journalists they consider friendly or acceptable would create a dangerous precedent. It could gradually turn press engagements into controlled public-relations exercises rather than opportunities for scrutiny.
That is why broadcasters should regard any attempt to undermine the independence of a colleague as a matter that concerns the wider profession.
Another concern arising from the incident is the apparent shift from addressing substantive questions to criticizing the journalist asking them.
Questions surrounding public land, government resources or the conduct of public officials are matters of legitimate public interest. They deserve clear answers, not personal attacks against the journalist who raises them.
A journalist’s personality, background or perceived disposition should not become a convenient distraction from the issue being investigated.
This does not mean journalists should be immune from criticism. They can, and should, be held accountable where they breach professional standards. But criticism should be based on facts and established journalistic principles, rather than being used as a weapon to intimidate journalists into silence.
When personal attacks become the preferred response to legitimate scrutiny, the larger casualty is public accountability.
Broadcasting is a profession that must defend its boundaries. This is particularly important because the incident comes against a background of recurring friction between government authorities and sections of the broadcast media.
Such disagreements are not unusual. Journalists and public officials will inevitably clash from time to time, particularly when reporters pursue difficult questions. What matters is how both sides respond to those disagreements.
For broadcasters, professionalism must remain paramount. Questions should be fair, relevant and supported by facts. But professionalism should not be confused with submission.
A journalist can be respectful without surrendering independence. A broadcaster can maintain decorum without abandoning difficult questions. And a media organization can cooperate with government institutions without becoming an extension of them.
This is where the importance of independent broadcasting becomes even more evident. Independent broadcasters serve as an essential pillar of Nigeria’s media pluralism because they provide platforms for voices that may otherwise struggle to gain visibility. Their local reach enables them to bring community concerns, public grievances and issues of accountability into national conversations.
If broadcasters are intimidated into avoiding difficult questions, the damage goes beyond individual journalists or individual media organizations. It weakens the diversity of voices available to Nigerians and ultimately limits citizens’ access to information.
Therefore, solidarity among broadcasters should not be interpreted as a demand that journalists be protected from legitimate scrutiny.
Rather, solidarity should mean defending the principle that journalists must be allowed to perform legitimate professional duties without intimidation, humiliation or arbitrary restrictions.
If one journalist is targeted today because of an uncomfortable question, another could face the same treatment tomorrow. Silence in the first instance can therefore become an invitation for the practice to continue.
The Nigerian media has a duty to protect its professional space. That duty is particularly important at a time when public confidence in institutions, accountability and democratic governance remains fragile.
Broadcasters should therefore resist attempts to personalize legitimate journalistic scrutiny. They should insist that disagreements with journalists be addressed through facts, evidence and established professional channels.
The press does not exist to please public officials. Its responsibility is to inform citizens, scrutinize those who exercise public authority and bring issues of public interest into the open.
Independent broadcasting is indispensable to that responsibility. By reflecting the diversity of Nigerian society and providing platforms for grassroots and community voices, independent broadcasters help ensure that public discourse is not controlled by a single authority or viewpoint.
That responsibility becomes meaningless if journalists are allowed to ask questions only when those in power approve of the questions, or approve of the journalists asking them.
The strength of Nigerian broadcasting lies not merely in the number of television and radio stations operating across the country, but in the freedom of those platforms to interrogate power, amplify citizens’ concerns and contribute to an informed society.
Broadcasters should therefore call for solidarity, not because journalists are above criticism, but because the independence of the press is too important to be left vulnerable to intimidation, personal attacks or attempts to dictate who gets to ask the questions.
Solidarity, in this context, is not about protecting individuals from accountability. It is about protecting the professional principle that makes accountability possible in the first place.
OPINION
How Nigeria is Closing the Net on Illicit Arms
By Sumaila Ogbaje
Undoubtedly, the steady flow of illegal weapons is keeping Nigeria’s security crisis alive.
From rural communities to active conflict zones, an underground trafficking network feeds criminal elements, directly enabling widespread terrorism, kidnapping, and banditry.
While security forces confront armed groups and recover weapons, the Federal Government is increasingly looking beyond the battlefield to disrupt the supply chains sustaining violence.
At the forefront is the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW), under the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).
The centre’s strategy is expanding from weapons recovery to understanding where illicit arms originate, how they move, where they are diverted and how circulation can be stopped.
The National Security Adviser, Malam Nuhu Ribadu, has described illicit weapons as “a deadly threat to the safety of our people”.
According to him, their proliferation sustains banditry in the North-West, communal conflicts in the North-Central and terrorist operations in the North-East.
The NSA said the government’s response was anchored on stronger inter-agency collaboration, disruption of criminal financing networks, enhanced border security and international partnerships.
At the recovery end, NCCSALW has continued to remove weapons permanently from circulation through transparent destruction exercises.
In its latest exercise, the centre destroyed 2,819 illicit, decommissioned and unserviceable weapons, bringing the number destroyed by the centre to about 19,000.
Ribadu said the exercise demonstrated the government’s commitment to ensuring recovered weapons never return to criminal hands.
“Recovering weapons alone is not enough. Public, transparent and verifiable destruction guarantees that these recovered weapons can never again be used against any Nigerian,” he said.
Yet, destruction addresses weapons already recovered. The bigger challenge is preventing replacement firearms from continuously entering the illicit market.
This has placed greater emphasis on securing legitimate weapons, strengthening armouries and preventing diversion from official stockpiles.
NCCSALW Director-General, retired DIG Johnson Kokumo, identified poor armoury management and diversion of government-owned weapons as major proliferation drivers.
He said porous borders, illicit local production and leakage from official stockpiles were among the major sources of illicit weapons.
“The most concerning source of proliferation remains the leakage of weapons from illicit stockpiles held by government agencies.’’
He warned that weapons procured for national security could become instruments of insecurity when weak controls and accountability gaps allow them to reach criminal networks.
Consequently, NCCSALW has intensified capacity development for personnel responsible for arms and ammunition management across security institutions.
The training focuses on record-keeping, storage standards, physical security, accountability and weapons tracking.
A recent programme organised with the HALO Trust and supported by the Netherlands sought to strengthen physical security and stockpile management.
Kokumo urged participants to apply the knowledge acquired, describing them as agents of change in improving arms management.
“You are returning as agents of change. Nigeria is counting on you to enforce accountability and professionalism in arms management.”
However, stronger armoury controls and weapons destruction cannot fully address the problem without knowing its current scale, sources, routes and patterns.
Nigeria’s last national baseline survey on illicit small arms and light weapons was conducted in 2016 and released in 2021.
A decade later, NCCSALW says the data can no longer adequately capture the country’s changing security environment.
Kokumo said Nigeria was preparing a new national baseline survey to provide updated statistics for planning and policymaking.
“The 2016 survey can no longer address the current pattern of proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria.”
He said the proposed survey would be Nigerian-owned and conducted primarily by Nigerian experts, with technical assistance from international organisations.
“We want to have an arms survey conducted by Nigeria for Nigerians and owned by Nigerians,” Kokumo said.
According to him, updated statistics will help the government develop appropriate policies and improve national security planning.
Dr Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy High Representative of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), said the available data was outdated.
“It is not that there is no data. There was a baseline survey conducted on small arms circulation in Nigeria in 2016.”
“That was a decade ago. Imagine Nigeria’s security landscape a decade ago and the security landscape today. A lot has changed.”
Ebo said changes had occurred in arms sources and routes, storage, tracing and marking, as well as activities of non-state armed groups.
“If government is going to have accurate national security planning, they need accurate data.
“So, what we have now is literally out of date, out of context.”
The new survey is expected to examine the nature, scale, distribution, sources and drivers of illicit arms proliferation across Nigeria.
UNODA and the Small Arms Survey in Geneva are expected to provide technical support and train Nigerian experts through a training-of-trainers approach.
Ebo said the process would enable Nigeria to build indigenous expertise capable of conducting future surveys and supporting similar exercises across Africa.
But data gathering alone cannot stop weapons proliferation. The information must translate into policies and interventions capable of closing identified vulnerabilities.
“The survey is not itself the end. It is a means to an end. So we need to have a policy that will flow from that survey.”
Beyond government and international partners, NCCSALW is also widening the response to include civil society organisations and communities.
At a recent roundtable, NCCSALW and UNODA engaged CSOs on strengthening community participation in arms-control efforts.
Ebo described CSOs as uniquely positioned to connect government policies with communities affected by illicit arms proliferation.
“Civil society is the bridge between the state and society,” he said.
He said traditional and religious leaders, women, youths, farmers, fishers and survivors of armed violence should contribute to the survey process.
Representing the National Arms Registrar, retired Maj.-Gen. Bamidele Shafa said CSOs’ proximity to communities provided valuable information on illicit weapons.
He said CSOs would play central roles in designing, validating and disseminating findings from the forthcoming baseline survey.
The EU also identified awareness creation, early warning, conflict prevention, policy advocacy, rehabilitation and reintegration among areas where CSOs could contribute.
The approach reflects a growing recognition that illicit arms proliferation is not merely a security-agency problem, but a national challenge requiring community ownership.
Nigeria’s challenge is further complicated by the transnational character of arms trafficking, making regional and international cooperation indispensable.
UNODA is supporting Nigeria through technical assistance, arms tracing and marking, policy development and implementation of international arms-control instruments.
At home, NCCSALW’s collaboration with the Armed Forces, police, intelligence services, Customs and other agencies remains crucial to disrupting illicit arms networks.
The ultimate objective is to prevent illicit weapons from becoming fuel for violence.
The success of the campaign, therefore, should not be measured only by the number of guns seized or destroyed.
The greater victory will come when Nigeria can identify supply lines, close loopholes and make it increasingly difficult for illegal weapons to reach criminal hands.
That is the battle beyond the battlefield — fought through intelligence, accurate data, secure armouries, effective borders, responsible communities and sustained national coordination.
For NCCSALW and its partners, choking the illicit arms pipeline could prove as important to Nigeria’s security as defeating those who wield the weapons.
Analysts say every trafficking route disrupted, armoury secured, weapon traced and firearm permanently destroyed represents another link broken in the chain of violence. (NAN)
OPINION
ICPC’s Red Flag and Tinubu’s Response: Why Nigeria Must Stop Fighting Corruption Backwards
By Nafisat Bello
There is something profoundly significant about an anti‑corruption agency raising a red flag — and the highest level of government responding with action. For years, Nigeria’s fight against corruption has followed a predictable and frustrating cycle: investigations begin, shocking discoveries emerge, suspects are named, money is recovered, outrage spreads, and then attention shifts to the next scandal, while the systems that enabled the abuse remain untouched.
The latest development surrounding the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System (IPPIS) offers a chance to break that cycle.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s directive for a comprehensive forensic audit of IPPIS — and of the Federal Government’s wider personnel, payroll and administrative systems — should not be dismissed as another routine announcement. It is a direct response to concerns raised by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and an acknowledgment of a truth Nigeria has long avoided: we cannot defeat corruption by chasing individual offenders, while leaving vulnerable systems intact.
The directive followed a Federal Executive Council resolution of 19 August, triggered by ICPC findings on suspected ghost workers, questionable government entities and weaknesses in public‑sector control systems. That sequence is important. The ICPC investigated. It exposed vulnerabilities. The findings reached the highest level of government. The Presidency responded with a systemic intervention.
This is how anti‑corruption institutions should influence governance.
At the National Spokespersons Awards and Economic Confidential Annual Lecture in Abuja, ICPC Chairman Dr Musa Adamu Aliyu (SAN) revealed disturbing insights from the Commission’s investigation. According to the ICPC, 908 suspected ghost workers were identified on IPPIS, and ₦941.99 million was traced to accounts linked to the alleged payroll fraud.
The numbers are alarming, but the deeper significance lies in the questions they raise.
If hundreds of fictitious workers could enter a system designed to sanitise the Federal Government’s payroll, the real issue is not simply who collected the money. It is: Who created the identities? Who validated them? Which controls failed? Who had the authority to introduce or approve them? Were the weaknesses technological, administrative or deliberately engineered? And who benefited from keeping those weaknesses alive?
These questions shift the conversation from corruption to systems failure.
For too long, Nigerians have treated ghost workers as the disease. They are not. They are symptoms. The real disease is the institutional weakness that allows ghosts to acquire identities, enter government systems, receive salaries and remain undetected.
Delete a ghost worker without closing the loophole that created it, and another ghost worker will take its place.
President Tinubu’s order for a forensic audit is significant because it goes beyond deleting names. It seeks to examine the architecture of government systems — personnel, payroll, pension, identity, biometric and financial controls.
The goal is simple: determine whether irregularities resulted from technical defects, weak processes, inadequate segregation of duties, human negligence or deliberate manipulation.
This is where serious anti‑corruption reform begins.
The same loophole that allows a fictitious employee to receive a salary could allow a fictitious company to obtain a contract or an illegitimate entity to access public resources. That is why the audit must extend beyond IPPIS to the entire ecosystem of government entities.
The audit is also expected to verify the legal basis of ministries, departments, agencies, commissions, councils and parastatals. In plain language, Nigeria must answer a question that should never have become complicated: Who genuinely belongs to the government — and who has merely found a way to appear as though they do?
It is astonishing that a country facing severe fiscal pressures still struggles to determine which entities are legitimately drawing from public resources.
Under Dr Musa Adamu Aliyu (SAN), the ICPC has demonstrated why anti‑corruption agencies must look beyond arrests and prosecutions. An arrest removes an offender. A prosecution punishes a culprit. Asset recovery returns stolen funds. But fixing a defective system prevents thousands of future offences.
That preventive dimension is the most valuable form of anti‑corruption work.
The IPPIS investigation shows how systems analysis can lead to investigation, financial recovery and institutional reform. In July, the Federal High Court reportedly issued a final forfeiture order for ₦941,994,079.86 linked to the payroll scheme. The presidential directive now pushes the process further — from recovering stolen funds to examining the machinery that enabled the theft.
Nigeria has never lacked committees, investigations, audits or white papers. What we have lacked is implementation. The forensic audit must therefore be rigorous, independent and professionally executed. It must not become another impressive report that disappears into government archives.
Where fraudulent identities were created, accountability must follow. Where administrators ignored irregularities, responsibility must be established. Where technology was manipulated, vulnerabilities must be closed. Where procedures are defective, they must be redesigned. Where entities lack legal foundation, decisive action must be taken.
Anything less would reduce a potentially transformative intervention to another temporary headline.
Every fraudulent salary payment is money that could have funded a classroom, hospital, road or security operation. Every fictitious entity increases the burden on the treasury. Every unresolved control weakness invites another fraudster.
Government cannot demand fiscal discipline from citizens while tolerating indiscipline within its own systems. Fiscal responsibility is not only about raising revenue or removing subsidies — it is also about protecting existing resources.
A government that seeks more revenue while allowing funds to leak through fraudulent payroll systems, is filling a bucket without repairing the holes.
Nigeria celebrates billions recovered after theft. But the greatest anti‑corruption success is not recovering ₦1 billion after it disappears — it is creating a system in which the ₦1 billion cannot disappear at all.
If the forensic audit can reveal how fraudulent identities entered IPPIS, how questionable entities gained recognition, how controls were bypassed and where responsibility failed, Nigeria will gain something more valuable than another recovery figure: institutional knowledge.
And institutional knowledge, when converted into stronger controls, can save billions over time.
Payroll and personnel systems should cross‑check identities across databases, detect duplicates, flag unusual payment patterns and create reliable audit trails. Technology cannot eliminate corruption, but it can make manipulation harder, easier to detect and more costly to conceal.
The ICPC has raised the red flag. The Federal Executive Council has deliberated. President Tinubu has ordered a forensic audit. But the real test is what happens next.
The ICPC must continue its investigations without fear or favour. MDAs must cooperate fully. Those against whom credible evidence exists must face consequences. Every loophole identified must be closed.
Nigeria does not need another war against ghost workers that ends when the ghosts disappear from the newspapers. It needs systems in which ghosts cannot enter the payroll in the first place.
President Tinubu therefore deserves credit for responding to the findings with a directive that extends beyond simply deleting suspected ghost workers. Likewise, the ICPC Chairman deserves recognition for championing anti-corruption reforms through investigation, advocacy and strategic communication.
The ultimate measure of this intervention will not be the number of ghost workers removed or the amount of money recovered. It will be whether Nigeria has the courage to follow the trail to its source, hold those responsible accountable and permanently close the doors through which the ghosts entered.
If that happens, Nigeria will not only fight corruption — it will finally begin to prevent it.
Nafisat Bello writes from Kubwa, Abuja.


